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Abstract 
We use the 2006 relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital in the English NHS to 
investigate the effect of hospital competition on dimensions of efficiency including indicators of 
resource management (admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, proportion of day cases, cancelled 
elective operations, proportion of untouched meals) and costs (cleaning services costs, laundry and 
linen costs, reference cost index for overall and elective activity). We employ a quasi difference-in-
difference approach and estimate seemingly unrelated regressions and unconditional quantile 
regressions with data on hospital trusts from 2002/03 to 2010/11. Our findings suggest that 
increased competition had mixed effects on efficiency. An additional equivalent rival increased 
admissions per bed and the proportion of day cases by 1.1 and 3.8 percentage points, and reduced 
the proportion of untouched meals by 3.5 percentage points, but it also increased the number of 
cancelled elective operations by 2.6%. Unconditional quantile regression results indicate that 
hospitals with low efficiency, as measured by fewer admissions per bed and a smaller proportion of 
day cases, are more responsive to competition. 
 
JEL classification: C21, H51, I11, I18, L1 
Keywords: competition, efficiency, choice, hospital, difference-in-difference. 
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 Introduction 
The efficiency of health care systems is a key goal for policy makers across OECD countries. Some of 
these, such as Australia, England, and Nordic countries, pursue greater efficiency by stimulating 
hospital competition through policies that give individuals the right to choose among hospitals 
(Cookson and Dawson, 2012, Propper, 2012, Palangkaraya and Yong, 2013). 
 
In this paper, we use the 2006 English NHS relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital to 
investigate whether there was any effect of the exposure to greater competition on hospital 
efficiency. The aim of the reform was to induce hospitals to compete on quality and to enhance 
efficiency. The theory suggests that, under a DRG-type payment system, patient choice may affect 
efficiency in different ways through its interaction with quality. Higher quality implies greater 
volumes of patients and, in turn, larger incentives to improve efficiency by containing costs to 
increase the profit margin on each extra patient (Ma, 1994). But making an additional effort to 
increase quality may reduce the cost-containment effort (Brekke et al., 2012). 
 
The previous empirical literature (reviewed briefly in section 1.2) focuses on unit costs and length of 
stay (e.g Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) measured at the aggregate level or for a specific 
procedure (hip and knee replacement). We provide a richer analysis by examining a wider range of 
efficiency dimensions. Hospitals may increase efficiency by treating more patients for a given 
number of beds. We therefore examine admissions per bed, bed occupancy, cancelled elective 
operations, and the proportion of day cases. Hospitals may also become more efficient via better 
management of amenities. We therefore examine the percentage of untouched meals, cleaning 
services costs and linen and laundry costs. Hospitals may also reduce unit costs which we measure 
through the reference cost index (RCI), which ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĐŽƐƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
average total costs for the same mix of services and is used by the policy maker to assess hospital 
efficiency (Department of Health, 2014). 
 
We analyse samples of public hospital trusts from the financial year 2002/03 to 2010/11. As with 
studies such as Cooper et al. (2012) and Gaynor et al. (2013), we use ƚŚĞ ?WĂƚŝĞŶƚŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƌĞĨŽƌŵĂƐĂ
natural experiment and use a quasi difference-in-difference approach. This empirical strategy 
exploits the variation in market structure facing different hospitals, under the plausible argument 
that hospitals in more competitive areas are more likely to change their behaviour after the 
relaxation of constraints on patient choice of provider. Unlike previous studies, we estimate the 
quasi difference-in-difference regressions for our nine efficiency indicators simultaneously through 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) (Zellner, 1962, 1963). SUR is supposed to improve the 
precision of the estimates, since we have a wide range of hospital efficiency outcomes which are 
potentially correlated. We also use the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) approach 
suggested by Firpo et al. (2009) to investigate whether the effect of competition varies for more or 
less efficient hospitals. ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ?ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ƌŝǀĂůƐ(Kessler 
and McClellan, 2000), which is calculated as the inverse of the predicted Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI). 
 
Our findings suggest that competition has mixed effects on efficiency. After the Choice policy, one 
more equivalent rival increases efficiency as measured by admissions per bed by 1.1% and the 
proportion of day cases increases by 3.8 percentage points and decreases the proportion of 
untouched meals by 3.5 percentage points. But the number of cancelled elective operations 
increases by 2.6%.1 There are no statistically significant effects on the other five efficiency indicators 
                                                 
1 We analyse the log of admissions per bed and cancelled elective operations. The effect of market structure on these 
indicators is therefore expressed as a percentage change. Instead, proportion of day cases and untouched meals are studied 
in their natural units and the effect of market structure is interpreted in percentage points. 
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(bed occupancy, cleaning services costs, laundry and linen costs, and RCI for all admissions and for 
elective admissions). We also find that SUR has generally better explanatory power than OLS and 
standard errors are smaller in most cases. The UQR results indicate that hospitals exhibiting low 
efficiency and facing greater competition may be more responsive to the Choice reform. For 
instance, one more equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 2.2% for hospitals with fewer 
admissions per bed (25th quantile), but there is no statistically significant effect for hospitals with 
more admissions per bed (e.g. 50th or 75th quantile). 
 
The next two sections briefly describe the related literature and the institutional background in the 
English NHS. Section 2 explains the econometric strategy. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 
provides the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.1. Related studies 
A number of empirical studies investigate the effect of competition on efficiency in the US (Gaynor 
and Town, 2011). Early studies suggest that hospital competition leads to an inefficient use of 
resources under a retrospective payment system (e.g. Joskow, 1980, Robinson and Luft, 1985).2 
Later studies find evidence of lower hospital costs in more competitive areas after the introduction 
of a prospective payment system and managed care (Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988, Bamezai et al., 
1999).3 For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and Geppert (2005), find that hospital 
competition has a welfare-enhancing effect by reducing costs and increasing quality for heart attack 
patients. 
 
For the UK, Söderlund et al. (1997) find no association between competition and unit cost after the 
introduction of the NHS internal market.4 Gaynor et al. (2013) focus on a more recent reform that 
aimed to stimulate competition among hospitals through Patient Choice (see section 1.2 for details 
on the reform). The authors implement a quasi difference-in-difference estimator and find that 
competition reduced length of stay but did not change expenditure per admission.5 Cooper et al. 
(2012) also exploit the Patient Choice reform and find that it reduced the pre-surgery length of stay 
of elective procedures such as hip and knee replacement, hernia repair, and arthroscopy more in 
competitive areas. By contrast, Bloom et al. (2015) use an IV strategy on a cross-section of hospitals 
in 2006 and find that competition increases average length of stay. 
 
Our study contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we extend the analysis of length of stay 
and unit costs to a wider set of efficiency indicators. We include measures of resource management 
such as admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, cancelled operations, proportion of day cases and 
untouched meals, and cost indicators such as cleaning services costs and laundry and linen costs, 
and the RCI as an alternative indicator to unit costs. Second, we estimate simultaneously the 
regressions for our indicators by SUR to account for correlations across the error terms. Third, we 
test whether the effect of competition on efficiency varies at different quantiles of the efficiency 
distribution using the UQR estimator of Firpo et al. (2009). 
 
                                                 
2 A retrospective payment system reimburses hospitals for the actual costs incurred for each patient.  
3 In 1982, hospitals in California were paid a fixed price for each patient treated, and new pro-competition laws allowed 
insurance companies to offer patients health care plans after negotiating the price with providers. 
4 The NHS internal market reform was introduced in 1991 and it stimulated competition by separating the roles of financier 
and supplier of health care services. Suppliers (hospitals trusts) had to compete to secure contracts, and therefore income, 
offered by the purchaser. The internal market was abolished some years later in 1997. 
5 Gaynor et al. (2013) study other aspect of hospital performance such as total number of admissions, total number and 
share of elective admissions, and total expenditure. They also investigate the effect of competition on quality as measured 
by heart attack and overall mortality. 
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1.2. Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides healthcare which is universal, tax financed, and 
free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 local 
health authorities, which use it to pay for secondary health care provided to NHS patients by public 
and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, the latter 
having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts providing research 
and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of conditions or client 
groups. Private hospitals are small, with no more than 50 beds, and overall provide about 6.5% of 
hospital beds (Boyle, 2011). They mostly focus on elective surgical procedures and, unlike public 
hospitals, they can refuse to treat highly severe patients (Mason et al., 2008). 
 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff Payment 
System. This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient classification system similar 
to the American Diagnosis-Related Group. HRGs are groups of patients who are homogeneous with 
respect to diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics. A fixed tariff is calculated for 
each HRG group as its national cost averaged across providers, but with adjustments for individual 
hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the higher costs of specialised care 
(Department of Health, 2013). 
 
,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚďǇƌĞůĂǆŝŶŐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůĨŽƌ
elective care. Before 2006, elective patients were mainly restricted to the set of hospitals in contract 
with their local health authority. In 2006, patients were given the right to be offered a choice of at 
least four hospitals for elective care. Since 2008, patients have been allowed to choose any qualified 
provider (Department of Health, 2009) ?ŚŽŝĐĞŝƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǁĞďƐŝƚĞ ?E,^ŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?
which provides information on some aspects of hospital performance (e.g. mortality, waiting times). 
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 METHODS 
To assess the impact of the Patient Choice reform on efficiency, we employ the following baseline 
model (Model I): 
 2006-07kt k t kt t k kty M d XP E T O D Ht       (1) 
 
where ykt is an efficiency indicator for hospital k=1«. in year t=2002/03«2010/11; µ is the 
intercept;   2005-062002-031 prek k kttM T M  ¦  measures the average pre-reform market structure of 
hospital k, with Mkt being the market structure of hospital k in year t and Tkpre the number of pre-
reform years for hospital k; dt2006/07 is a dummy equal to one from year 2006/07 onwards, when 
the policy was introduced; Xkt is a vector of hospital-level control variables (e.g. percentage of male 
patients, patient age); Ȝt and Įk are respectively year dummies to account for time trend (e.g. of 
technical progress) and hospital fixed effects to allow for time-invariant unobserved factors; and İkt 
is an idiosyncratic error term. We use 0ժ k instead of Mkt in equation (1) to avoid potential 
endogeneity due to, for example, low quality and efficiency of some hospitals affecting entry by 
rivals after the reform. 
 
Model I is a quasi difference-in-difference regression because it uses a variable with differing 
treatment intensity rather than a treatment or control group (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p. 175). The 
idea is that the patient choice policy affects to a greater extent areas with more providers (i.e. more 
competitive areas) than areas with fewer providers (i.e. less competitive areas). The English NHS fits 
this empirical strategy because of the high geographical variation in the English hospital market 
structure.6 
 
The coefficient ȕ in Model I is our difference-in-difference estimator. It indicates whether the effect 
of competition on efficiency changed after the reform. For example, ȕ>0 implies that after the 
choice reform, hospitals in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the efficiency 
indicator compared to hospitals in less competitive areas. ȕ is identified under the common trend 
assumption (i.e. efficiency in both more competitive and less competitive areas follow the same 
trend in the absence of the reform). 
 
We estimate Model I for nine efficiency indicators. These outcomes are likely to be influenced by 
common unobservable factors (e.g. unmeasured patient characteristics) and to respond to 
exogenous shocks (e.g. introduction of a new medical technology). As a result, the error terms across 
the nine regressions may be correlated. The single-equation OLS estimator neglects such 
correlations which, if accounted for, may allow more efficient estimates. We, therefore, estimate 
Model I jointly for all the efficiency indicators via a SUR model.  
 
SUR and OLS are equivalent if there is no correlation between error terms (Zellner, 1962). Even 
when errors are correlated, SUR and OLS are equivalent if the covariates exhibit greater collinearity 
across regressions than within regressions. If covariate collinearity within regressions is greater than 
across regressions, SUR will still provide more efficient estimates (Baltagi, 2011, p. 245). This latter 
condition is likely to be met in our study because, although using mostly the same covariates across 
regressions, the inclusion of hospital dummies (i.e. the hospital fixed effects) may induce some 
collinearity within regressors, and also because of the heterogeneity of the different efficiency 
                                                 
6 For instance, hospitals in London generally compete with more than ten rivals within a radius of 30 km but some hospitals 
in the North East of England do not face any rival within the same radius. 
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indicators we use.7 We estimate SUR by maximum likelihood and we cluster standard errors within 
hospitals to allow for the serial correlation of errors over time. We test the validity of SUR against 
OLS using a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test on the stacked error terms to verify the hypothesis of 
independent equations (i.e. no correlation between error terms). 
 
As in Kessler and McClellan (2000), we test whether the effect of the market structure on efficiency 
is non-linear using Model II: 
 
 2006-07kt k t kt t k kty Q d XP E T O D Ht      , (2) 
 
where Qk is a vector of three dummies constructed on the quartile of the pre-reform market 
structure (0ժ k) distribution: a dummy equal to one for the second quartile (hospitals subject to low 
competition), one for the third quartile (high competition), and another for the fourth quartile (very 
high competition). The omitted dummy for the first quartile (hospitals subject to the lowest 
competition) is the reference category. 
 
We also estimate Model III that, differently from the previous models, controls for time-varying 
market structure: 
 
 2006-07kt kt t kt kt t k kty M d M XP E G T O D Ht       . (3) 
 
The coefficient ȕ in equation (3) has the same interpretation as in Model I, while į captures the 
effect of competition in the pre-reform period. 
 
As an additional robustness check, we implement Model IV, a more flexible version of Model III, 
which allows ȕ to vary in each period as follows: 
 
 kt t kt kt kt t k kty PM M XP E U T O D H       , (4) 
 
where Pt is a vector of year dummies, excluding year 2005/06. This model provides information on 
the evolution of the effect of competition on efficiency in each pre- and post-reform year. We 
expect a significant effect of competition on efficiency in the post-reform years and no effect in the 
pre-reform years. 
 
All the above models focus on the effect of competition on average efficiency. It may be argued that 
there is more scope for competition to affect efficiency when efficiency is low. In general, the effect 
of market structure on efficiency might vary (non-linearly) depending on the levels of the efficiency 
indicators. To investigate this, we implement in Model V the UQR approach suggested by Firpo et al. 
(2009) as follows: 
 




                                                 
7 Intuitively, by using a lot of different efficiency indicators, the conditional mean function of each indicator is likely to be 
affected differently by covariates, choice policy and hospital fixed-effects, thus reducing the potential of collinearity across 
regression on different outcomes. 
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where RĲ(ykt) captures the Ĳth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator distribution.8 
Estimates from this approach have an interpretation similar to model I: ȕĲ>0 indicates that, as a 
result of the choice policy, hospitals in the Ĳth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator 
distribution and located in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the efficiency 
indicator compared to similar hospitals located in less competitive areas.9 We focus on the 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th, and 90th unconditional quantiles and we bootstrap clustered standard errors using 1,000 
replications.10 
  
                                                 
8More formally, Rʏ(ykt) is the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) calculated as RIF(ykt;qʏ)=qʏ+(ʏ-1[yktчqʏ])/fy(qʏ), where qʏ is 
the ʏth quantile of ykt, 1[yktчqʏ] is a dummy equal to one when ykt is below qʏ, and fy(qʏ) is the estimated density function at 
qʏ. The density function is estimated assuming a Gaussian kernel and using the optimal bandwidth that minimises the mean 
integrated squared error. 
9 Using UQRs to evaluate the effect of a change in policy provides several advantages compared to the alternative approach 
of conditional quantile regressions (CQR) introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). In CQRs, the covariates have the effect 
of redefining the quantiles of the dependent variable distribution (Borah and Basu, 2013): a hospital in the top of the 
efficiency indicator distribution may end up in the bottom of the conditional distribution. Hence, we cannot conclude 
whether explanatories have bigger or smaller effects on hospitals in particular quantiles. A further limitation of the 
conditional quantile approach concerns fixed effects, which must be treated as pure location shifters that remain constant 
across quantiles (e.g. Canay, 2011). This might be a strong assumption in empirical applications. In our case, for example, 
fixed effects are likely to capture unobserved case-mix, which needs to yield the same effect on the outcome for all hospitals, 
regardless of their conditional efficiency. 
10 We perform all estimations in Stata. We fit SUR through the command gsem. The unconditional quantile regression is 
implemented using xtrifreg (Borgen, 2016). 
Does hospital competition improve efficiency? The effect of the patient choice reform in England  7 
 
 DATA 
3.1. Efficiency indicators 
We have nine efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11.11 As a measure of resource 
management, we use the number of admissions per bed calculated with data on admissions from 
NHS Digital and on beds from the NHS statistics. Other indicators of resource management are bed 
occupancy rate and number of cancelled elective operations for non-clinical reasons from the NHS 
statistics, and proportion of day cases and proportion of untouched meals from the NHS Digital. We 
also use cost indicators including cleaning services costs and laundry and linen costs from the NHS 
Digital, and RCI and elective RCI which are available from the reference cost database.12  
 
3.2. Measure of hospital market structure 
tĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ?equivalent ?number of rival hospitals, including both 
public and private providers. This is calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 ?,,/ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĨůŽǁƐ ?13 Following Kessler and McClellan (2000), we 
calculate the HHI for hospital k as follows: 
 
  2k ko o ko oko o kHHI S HHI S S  ¦ ¦ ¦  (6) 
 
where Sko is the predicted market share of hospital k¶Vpatients living in neighbourhood o within 30 
km; and HHIo indicates the concentration of patients across neighbourhoods, which is calculated 
through the predicted share of patients living in neighbourhood o admitted to hospital k (Sok).14 The 
hospital HHI (HHIk) can be interpreted as a weighted average of the neighbourhood HHI (HHIo), 
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞůƉƐƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĞĂĐŚŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?15 The inverse of hospital HHI (HHIkí1) represents 
therefore the number of rivals that would exist if patients were uniformly distributed across 
hospitals. The equivalent number of rivals is constructed using data from Hospital Episode Statistics 
(Gravelle et al., 2014). 
 
3.3. Other control variables 
We include a number of control variables: the percentage of male patients, percentage of patients 
between 15 and 59, 60 and 74, and older than 74 years (the reference category is the age range 
between 0 and 14), and percentage of emergency admissions. We also use a dummy for Foundation 
Trusts. Information for these variables comes from the NHS Digital. In addition, we control for 
exogenous variation in input prices (e.g. nurses, buildings) through the market forces factor (MFF) 
                                                 
11 Table A4 has the links to the websites where each variable was collected. 
12 Cleaning services costs include all pay (e.g. salaries) and non-pay (e.g. equipment) costs for both in-house or contracted 
out cleaning services. Laundry and linen costs are defined in a similar way. 
13  To predict the patient flows, we estimate the following Poisson choice model for each year: 
   21 2 3| , exp,ko ko k o ko ko k oI distance distance distanceE L I I c c   z z LI F , where Iko is the number of hospital k¶V
patients living in neighbourhood o, distanceko is the distance between neighbourhood o¶V centroid and hospital k 
located within 30 km, zk is a vector of hospital type dummies to control for public hospitals, foundation trusts, and teaching 
hospitals, and Lo is a vector of LSOA dummies. 
14 The patient share Sok is the ratio between the number of hospital k¶Vpatients living in neighbourhood o (Iko) and the 
number of patients living in neighbourhood o (Io), while Sko is computed dividing Iko by the number of hospital k¶V
patients (Ik). 
15 The neighbourhood is a small geographical area called LSOA (Lower Super Output Area), which includes on average 1,500 
inhabitants but no less than 1,000. 
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index collected from the reference cost database. We also add the number of beds to the regressions 
for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs. 
 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The sample includes between 143 (laundry and linen costs) 
and 173 (RCI) hospitals observed on average for a period of almost 9 years. In each year, there are 
on average 110 admissions per bed. The bed occupancy rate is 86%. 30.7% of patients are on 
average admitted as day cases, and hospitals cancel on average 359 elective operations in a year. On 
average, 7.6% of meals served to patients remain untouched, the cleaning services and the laundry 
and linen costs are respectively £2,842,000 and £807,000. The reference cost indexes are 100 by 
construction: a RCI greater than 100 indicates that a ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĐŽƐƚƐĂƌĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ
national average total costs for the same HRG groups.16 
 
Table 1 ʹ Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Def Obs Trust Year Mean 
SD 
Min Max 
Overall Between Within 
Efficiency indicator 
          
Admissions per bed E 1,498 171 8.76 110 31 25 18 38 319 
Bed occupancy rate (%) E 1,503 172 8.74 86.0 6.3 5.3 3.5 50.5 99.2 
Proportion of day cases (%) E 1,477 169 8.74 30.8 8.6 7.9 3.5 4.6 90.5 
Cancelled elective operations I 1,477 170 8.69 360 288 250 142 6 2426 
Proportion of untouched meals (%) I 1,382 160 8.64 7.6 5.4 3.7 4.0 0.0 49.0 
Cleaning services costs (£1,000) I 1,381 159 8.69 2,842 1,823 1,580 901 69 12,941 
Laundry and linen costs (£1,000) I 1,215 143 8.5 807 488 459 160 40 2,864 
Reference cost index I 1,516 173 8.76 100.8 12.9 11.5 5.8 66.0 195.8 
Elective reference cost index I 1,498 171 8.76 100.2 16.5 13.6 9.3 60.5 197.3 
Measure of market structure 
          
Equivalent number of rivals (HHI-1) 3.7 2.5 2.4 0.7 1.0 13.6 
Control variable 
          
Percentage of male patients (%) 44.1 4.8 4.7 0.9 14.8 65.3 
Percentage of patients between 0 and 14 years (%) 13.5 13.1 12.9 1.2 0.0 94.2 
Percentage of patients between 15 and 59 years (%) 44.4 8.0 7.8 1.6 5.8 74.3 
Percentage of patients between 60 and 74 years (%) 21.0 5.9 5.7 1.1 0.0 47.0 
Percentage of patients older than 74 years (%) 20.8 6.2 6.1 1.3 0.0 42.8 
Percentage of emergency admissions (%) 35.2 9.6 9.1 2.7 0.2 61.8 
Number of beds 686 382 374 65 31 2,523 
Foundation trust 0.287 0.453 0.301 0.339 0 1 
Market forces factor 1.003 0.074 0.074 0.014 0.886 1.323 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency. 






                                                 
16 Table A2 provides the unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators. 
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Although all indicators are used to capture efficiency, we expect admissions per bed, bed occupancy 
rate, and proportion of day cases to be positively correlated with efficiency, while the others to be 
negatively correlated. Table A1 of the Appendix shows simple pairwise correlations. For example, 
admissions per bed is positively correlated with bed occupancy rate and negatively correlated with 
the RCIs. Similarly, the bed occupancy rate is negatively correlated with the RCIs, and the proportion 
of day cases is negatively correlated with the laundry and linen costs. Correlations are generally low 
and mostly below 30%. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in some efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11.17 Over the 
whole period, we note a positive time trend in admissions per bed, cleaning services costs, and 
laundry and linen costs. A negative trend is instead observed for the percentage of untouched 
meals. Bed occupancy rate, rate of day cases, and cancelled elective operations have a positive trend 
only from or after 2006/07. Cancelled elective operations, however, decrease from 2009/10 to 
2010/11. 
 
Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics on covariates. There are on average 3.7 equivalent rivals. 
44.1% of patients are male, 13.5% are between 0 and 14 years old, 44.4% are between 15 and 59, 
21% are between 60 and 74, and 20.8% are older than 74 years. 35.2% of patients are admitted in an 
emergency. Hospitals have on average 686 beds. 28.3% of trusts are Foundation Trusts, and the MFF 
is on average 1 by construction. 
                                                 
17 We omit the trend of the RCIs because their annual average equals 100 by construction. 
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Figure 1 ʹ Trend in the efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 20010/11 
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 Results 
Table 2 shows the results for Model I. The key coefficient indicates whether the effect of 
competition on efficiency changed after the policy. It is statistically significant at 5% level in the 
regression for admissions per bed, proportion of day cases, cancelled elective operations, and 
proportion of untouched meals. One more equivalent rival increases on average admissions per bed 
by 1.1%. Table A3 in the appendix suggests that this is due to competition reducing beds but having 
no effect on admissions.18 
 
Competition increases efficiency when measured by the proportion of day cases and untouched 
meals. An additional equivalent rival increases the proportion of day cases by 0.38 percentage points 
and reduces the proportion of untouched meals by 0.35 percentage points. In contrast, competition 
reduces efficiency when measured as cancelled elective operations: one more equivalent rival 
increases cancelled elective operations by 2.6%. 
 
Table 2 also displays the coefficients on control variables. For instance, the proportion of male 
patients is associated with a higher proportion of day cases (0.323). A one percentage point increase 
in patients between 60 and 74 years old is associated with more admissions per bed by 1.2%. A 
higher proportion of emergency patients is associated with a lower proportion of day cases (-0.646). 
Foundation trusts are associated with greater inefficiency having on average fewer admissions per 
bed by 3% and a lower bed occupancy by one percentage point. The bottom of Table 2 reports the p-
value for the Breusch-Pagan test, which indicates the presence of correlation among the error terms 
across regressions. This suggests that SUR may have better explanatory power than OLS thanks to its 
higher precision of the estimates (i.e. lower standard errors).19 
 
Table 3 has the key results for Model II, in which the policy break dummy is interacted with three 
dummies indicating whether a hospital is subject to low competition, high competition or very high 
competition, respectively. The reference category indicates hospitals subject to very low 
competition. The estimates suggest that the choice policy has a greater effect on efficiency for 
hospitals exposed to high or very high competition compared to hospitals exposed to very low 
competition. Admissions per bed decrease by 5.2% and the proportion of untouched meals reduces 
by 2.18 percentage points for hospitals exposed to very high competition. The proportion of day 
cases goes up by 1.09 and 2.1 percentage points for hospitals facing high competition and very high 
competition, while the RCI falls by 2.7 points for hospitals facing high competition. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the key results for Model III and IV. Model III controls for market structure varying 
over time. Compared to Model I, the key coefficient is unchanged for admissions per bed and 
proportion of day cases, but it is no longer significant at 5% level for cancelled elective operations 
and proportion of untouched meals. The association between competition and efficiency before the 
reform (į) is never statistically significant at 5% level. The association between competition and 
efficiency after the reform (ȕ+į) is significant only for the admissions per bed: an additional 
equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 1.5% (0.9%+0.6%) after the reform.
                                                 
18 Evidence on beds is weak in model I and III but stronger in model IV (Table A3). In Model I, an additional equivalent rival 
reduces beds by 0.5%, but this estimate is only significant at 10% level. We observe higher statistical significance in model 
IV: an additional equivalent rival significantly reduces beds by 0.6% in 2007/08, 0.8% in 2008/09, and 1.3% in 2010/11. 
19 The Breusch-Pagan test suggests that SUR is favoured also for Model II, III, and IV. 
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Policy break 2006/07*Pre-reform HHI-1 
0.011 0.053 0.381 0.026 -0.347 0.0004 -0.005 -0.306 -0.516 
(0.004)** (0.120) (0.118)*** (0.013)** (0.172)** (0.007) (0.008) (0.275) (0.391) 
Proportion of male patients 
-0.001 -0.036 0.323 -0.033 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.053 0.108 
(0.004) (0.152) (0.147)** (0.017)* (0.242) (0.009) (0.009) (0.257) (0.417) 
Proportion of patients between 15 and 59 
0.018 -0.043 0.019 -0.017 -0.178 0.018 0.005 -0.509 -0.447 
(0.004)*** (0.143) (0.120) (0.014) (0.171) (0.010)* (0.007) (0.283)* (0.420) 
Proportion of patients between 60 and 74 
0.012 -0.185 1.085 0.011 -0.273 0.010 -0.003 -0.424 -0.855 
(0.006)** (0.205) (0.172)*** (0.021) (0.238) (0.011) (0.012) (0.361) (0.637) 
Proportion of patients beyond 74 
-0.002 0.120 -0.303 0.014 -0.098 0.006 0.021 -0.200 0.267 
(0.005) (0.172) (0.143)** (0.019) (0.244) (0.012) (0.010)** (0.309) (0.568) 
Proportion of emergency patients 
-0.007 -0.035 -0.646 -0.020 -0.106 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.336 
(0.002)*** (0.055) (0.056)*** (0.006)*** (0.069) (0.003) (0.003) (0.119) (0.178)* 
Log of beds 
   -0.013  0.088 0.318   
   (0.248)  (0.101) (0.080)***   
Foundation trust 
-0.030 -1.021 -0.505 0.079 -0.283 0.015 0.116 0.309 1.143 
(0.012)** (0.441)** (0.328) (0.054) (0.541) (0.024) (0.539) (0.801) (1.439) 
Market forces factor 
0.348 7.295 -16.257 -0.120 -27.029 -0.347 0.028 -1.691 -29.030 
(0.280) (8.839) (9.187)* (1.053) (12.636)** (0.568) (0.029) (20.431) (27.186) 
Constant 
3.694 86.790 42.691 8.049 52.485 6.388 3.568 137.249 142.996 
(0.474)*** (15.379)*** (13.890)*** (2.257)*** (17.983)*** (1.291)*** (1.000)*** (29.858)*** (47.614)*** 
SUR estimation. All regressions control for hospital and year fixed effects. Policy break 2006/07 is an indicator for years 2006/7 to 2010/11.  
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value<0.0001. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3 ʹ Competition quartiles and efficiency: Model II  
Efficiency indicator 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Log of admissions per bed 
0.011 0.026 0.052 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)** 
Bed occupancy rate 
0.549 1.285 0.951 
(0.661) (0.691)* (0.815) 
Proportion of day cases 
0.809 1.085 2.104 
(0.626) (0.497)** (0.744)*** 
Log of cancelled elective operations 
-0.025 0.084 0.119 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.084) 
Proportion of untouched meals 
-1.342 -1.805 -2.175 
(0.908) (0.948)* (1.043)** 
Log of cleaning services costs 
-0.036 -0.054 -0.021 
(0.038) (0.048) (0.045) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 
0.055 -0.009 0.020 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.046) 
Reference cost index 
-0.369 -2.702 -1.892 
(1.147) (0.998)*** (1.497) 
Elective reference cost index 
2.473 -2.331 -3.301 
(1.939) (1.986) (1.973)* 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for gender, age categories, 
emergency admissions, foundation trusts, and market forces factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, 
cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Quartile dummies are constructed on the pre-reform HHI-1: 2nd quartile=low-competition market, 3rd quartile=high-
competition market, 4th quartile=very high-competition market; 1st quartile=very low-competition market 
(reference category). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Policy break*HHI-1 0.009 0.051 0.329 0.022 -0.256 0.002 0.00002 -0.186 -0.422 
(0.004)** (0.110) (0.105)*** (0.011)* (0.156) (0.006) (0.007) (0.220) (0.338) 
HHI-1 0.006 0.020 -0.277 -0.003 -0.156 -0.019 -0.013 -0.556 -0.387 
(0.007) (0.208) (0.170) (0.027) (0.306) (0.010)* (0.015) (0.370) (0.710) 
Model IV 
Dummy 2002/03*HHI-1 -0.004 -0.007 -0.246 -0.016 0.567 0.024 0.012 0.122 -0.533 
(0.006) (0.214) (0.179) (0.034) (0.317)* (0.015)* (0.012) (0.460) (0.713) 
Dummy 2003/04*HHI-1 -0.004 -0.036 -0.134 -0.018 0.178 -0.007 0.018 -0.129 -0.268 
(0.004) (0.144) (0.137) (0.020) (0.225) (0.018) (0.010)* (0.269) (0.489) 
Dummy 2004/05*HHI-1 -0.002 -0.042 -0.035 -0.024 0.347 0.004 -0.007 -0.094 0.204 
(0.003) (0.105) (0.086) (0.013)* (0.192)* (0.007) (0.009) (0.190) (0.383) 
Dummy 2006/07*HHI-1 0.003 -0.221 0.161 0.010 0.118 0.008 0.002 0.014 -0.197 
(0.004) (0.099)** (0.087)* (0.009) (0.114) (0.006) (0.006) (0.258) (0.353) 
Dummy 2007/08*HHI-1 0.008 0.195 0.239 0.025 0.070 -0.005 0.001 -0.603 -0.542 
(0.004)* (0.171) (0.138)* (0.013)* (0.153) (0.010) (0.009) (0.255)** (0.382) 
Dummy 2008/09*HHI-1 0.006 0.205 0.292 0.024 -0.015 0.006 0.001 -0.204 -0.531 
(0.005) (0.205) (0.113)*** (0.015) (0.253) (0.006) (0.009) (0.250) (0.446) 
Dummy 2009-10*HHI-1 0.008 -0.001 0.350 -0.002 -0.374 0.003 0.002 -0.189 -0.546 
(0.005) (0.161) (0.126)*** (0.019) (0.200)* (0.006) (0.009) (0.253) (0.480) 
Dummy 2010/11*HHI-1 0.013 0.153 0.423 -0.016 -0.353 0.005 0.007 -0.356 -0.691 
(0.005)** (0.174) (0.155)*** (0.018) (0.193)* (0.007) (0.009) (0.279) (0.489) 
HHI-1 0.004 0.044 -0.359 0.014 -0.096 -0.016 -0.009 -0.504 -0.555 
(0.008) (0.228) (0.186)* (0.028) (0.335) (0.013) (0.016) (0.401) (0.735) 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and market forces factor. 
The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Post-reform effect of market structure (p-value) in Model III (ɴнɷ). Log of admission per bed: 0.015 (0.014); bed occupancy rate: 0.071 (0.745); proportion of day cases: 0.052 (0.753); log of cancelled 
operations: 0.019 (0.469); proportion of untouched meals: -0.412 (0.155); log of cleaning services costs: -0.017 (0.114); log of laundry and linen costs: -0.013 (0.360); reference cost index: -0.742 
(0.101); elective reference cost index: -0.809 (0.214). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Model IV analyses how the effect of competition on efficiency changes in every year before and after 
the policy implementation. Considering the proportion of day cases, for example, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and insignificant in the pre-reform periods, and 
increasingly positive and significant in the post-reform periods. Such estimates clearly indicate a 
persistent effect of the reform on efficiency as captured by the proportion of day cases. 
 
Table 5 illustrates UQR results. They suggest that less efficient hospitals tend to respond more to 
competition. This is the case of efficiency outcomes as the admissions per bed, the percentage of 
day cases and, to a lesser extent, the percentage of untouched meals. For hospitals with fewer 
admissions per bed (25th quantile), an additional equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 
2.2%. Similarly, for hospitals with lower proportions of day cases (10th or 25th quantile), an additional 
equivalent rival increases such proportions by 0.91 or 0.4 percentage points. If hospitals have a high 
proportion of untouched meals (75th quantile), an additional equivalent rival decreases untouched 
meals by 0.43 percentage points, even though this result is only significant at 10% level. Finally, 
when hospitals have fewer cancelled elective operations (10th quantile), an additional equivalent 
rival leads to an increase in this indicator by 7.2%. 
 
Table 5 ʹ Effects of competition at different efficiency quantiles: Model V 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Log of admissions per bed 
0.019 0.022 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.015) (0.011)** (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Bed occupancy rate 
0.461 0.147 -0.079 -0.183 -0.211 
(0.408) (0.190) (0.148) (0.191) (0.252) 
Proportion of day cases 
0.914 0.396 0.220 0.101 0.277 
(0.372)** (0.201)** (0.202) (0.255) (0.377) 
Log of cancelled elective operations 
0.072 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.041 
(0.037)** (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
Proportion of untouched meals 
-0.076 -0.196 -0.168 -0.429 -0.627 
(0.160) (0.128) (0.144) (0.245)* (0.469) 
Log of cleaning services costs 
0.018 -0.037 -0.031 -0.007 0.053 
(0.036) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 
-0.075 -0.021 0.010 -0.018 0.016 
(0.046) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.032) 
Reference cost index 
-0.419 -0.319 -0.233 -0.532 0.062 
(0.281) (0.248) (0.250) (0.424) (1.068) 
Elective reference cost index 
0.295 -0.316 -0.395 -0.390 -1.934 
(0.501) (0.386) (0.487) (0.742) (1.592) 
Unconditional quantile regression. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for 
gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and market forces factor. 
The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs also 
control for beds. 
Bootstrapped clustered standard errors (using 1,000 replications) in parenthesis. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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 Discussion and conclusion 
This study has investigated whether competition improves some dimensions of hospital efficiency in 
England using the exogenous variation generated by the Patient Choice reform and the geographical 
variation in the market structure. We find that greater competition induces hospitals to increase 
their efficiency by increasing admissions per bed and proportion of day cases, and by reducing the 
proportion of untouched meals. In contrast, hospitals appear less efficient in terms of cancelled 
elective operations. The effect of the choice reform is larger for hospitals facing more rivals. We also 
observe that less efficient hospitals generally respond more to competition. 
 
Hospitals may have varied their efficiency levels, due to the increase of patient choice, by spreading 
their fixed costs on a larger share of hospital treatment reimbursements, which explains the increase 
in admissions per bed and the proportion of day cases. Our findings on admissions per bed are in line 
with the recent concerns about the reduction of beds in NHS hospitals (Hosken, 2016). Also the 
result on the proportion of day cases is largely coherent with the reduction in pre-surgery and 
overall length of stay on specific elective procedures found by Cooper et al. (2012). The authors 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ “ďǇ 2010, patients were 41.7% more likely to receive surgery on the day that they 
ǁĞƌĞĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?(Cooper et al., 2012, p.17-18). Similarly, 
hospitals might have reduced their variable sunk costs, e.g. by reducing the proportion of untouched 
meals and other wasted items. However, the efficiency improvements in the previous dimensions 
may have also brought English NHS hospitals close to or over their full capacity levels, especially in 
the case of NHS clinician and nursing workforce understaffing (Bates, 2005). If this is the case, the 
increases in admissions per bed and proportion of day cases may have also caused a rise in the 
number of cancelled elective operations. In fact, since NHS hospitals cannot refuse emergency 
patient treatments, cancelling elective operations is the most likely mechanism that hospitals have 
to release pressure due to excess demand of overall hospital services (i.e. the sum of emergency and 
elective admissions) compared to the hospital equilibrium levels. Hospitals can also increase waiting 
times as another viable mechanism to reduce excess demand pressure. But this alternative 
mechanism was not available to English NHS hospital management (and clinicians) in the years 
following the Choice policy (i.e. 2006-2011) due to the waiting time reforms, which imposed heavy 
hospital management penalties on hospitals with long waiting times (Propper et al., 2008). Cancelled 
elective operations may have increased also because of some distortions in the payment 
arrangements. Cookson et al. (2017) show that providers were more likely to cancel elective 
operations until 2009/10 (our penultimate analysed financial year). Hospitals could cancel 
operations and still receive a tariff until 2009/10 and, therefore, the authors suggest that this 
produced an incentive to cancel operations to increase revenues. Such behaviour may have been 
exacerbated once competition had been introduced in 2006.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 ʹ Pairwise correlations across efficiency indicators 
Efficiency indicator Def (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Log of admissions per bed E 1.0000  
        
(2) Bed occupancy rate E 0.2018*  1.0000 
       
(3) Proportion of day cases E 0.1028*  -0.1041* 1.0000 
      
(4) Log of cancelled elective operations I -0.0181  0.1674* 0.0551 1.0000 
     
(5) Proportion of untouched meals I 0.0405  0.0159 -0.0199 0.0134 1.0000 
    
(6) Log of cleaning services costs I 0.2821*  0.2116* -0.1088* 0.5955* -0.002 1.0000 
   
(7) Log of laundry and linen costs I 0.1926*  0.3147* -0.2760* 0.6670* 0.0185 0.8133* 1.0000 
  
(8) Reference cost index I -0.2197*  -0.1566* 0.0982* -0.1022* -0.0121 -0.0550 -0.1696* 1.0000 
 
(9) Elective reference cost index I -0.2575*  -0.1590* -0.045 -0.1227* -0.0267 -0.0904* -0.1776* 0.7412* 1.0000 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency 
* = statistically significant at 5% level after Bonferroni adjustment 
  
Table A2 ʹ Unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Admissions per bed 75 91 109 126 142 
Bed occupancy rate 78.2 82.8 86.6 90.2 93.3 
Proportion of day cases 22.1 26.4 30.0 34.6 39.1 
Cancelled elective operations 86 154 284 475 763 
Proportion of untouched meals 2.4 4.2 6.4 9.6 14.5 
Cleaning services costs 987 1,547 2,440 3,676 5,207 
Laundry and linen costs 280 465 709 1,052 1,430 
Reference cost index 88.2 92.6 98.0 106.3 116.2 
Elective reference cost index 82.2 88.9 97.2 108.6 122.6 
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Observations  1,516 1,507 
Number of trusts  173 172 
Average  73,232 682 
OLS estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control 
for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, foundation trusts, and market 
forces factor. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A4 ʹ Data sources 
Variable Link 








occupancy/bed-data-overnight/  Bed occupancy rate 
Cancelled elective operations 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/cancelled-elective-
operations/cancelled-ops-data/  
Proportion of untouched 
meals 
http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp  
Cleaning services costs 
Laundry and linen costs 











Foundation trusts http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp  
Market forces factor http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyouror
ganisation/NHScostingmanual/DH_129310?PageOperation=email  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs  
 
